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Abstract
We study black-box attacks on machine learning classifiers where each query
to the model incurs some cost or risk of detection to the adversary. We focus
explicitly on minimizing the number of queries as a major objective. Specifically,
we consider the problem of attacking machine learning classifiers subject to a
budget of feature modification cost while minimizing the number of queries, where
each query returns only a class and confidence score. We describe an approach
that uses Bayesian optimization to minimize the number of queries, and find that
the number of queries can be reduced to approximately one tenth of the number
needed through a random strategy for scenarios where the feature modification cost
budget is low.
1 Introduction
Recent works reveal the vulnerabilities of current machine learning models to carefully-crafted
adversarial examples [1, 2, 3, 4]. In many scenarios, complete model information is not available to
the attacker and hence it is important to study black-box attacks, where the attackers do not have full
knowledge of the model but only some way of interacting with it as a black box. In this work, we
focus on attacks where only query access to the model is available and each query result consists of a
predicted class and confidence score.
Since queries to the model are costly, attackers are motivated to minimize the number of queries
needed when interacting with the model. For example, if the adversary is attempting to craft messages
that evade a spam email detection systems, each query to the underlying classification model involves
sending an email and possibly poisoning an account, so the adversary is not be able to afford large
number of email queries [5]. Hence, our problem is: find an adversarial example that satisfies the
constraints on feature modification with the minimal number of queries. This problem can be cast as
a constrained optimization problem:
min Q(x) s.t. f(x) 6= f(xA) ∧ c(x,xA) ≤ C (1)
where Q(x) denotes the total number of queries consumed in searching for an adversarial example for
seed sample x, f(x) denotes the prediction label of instance x, c(x,xA) denotes feature modification
cost, where xA is the original instance, and C is the budget for feature modification. In this paper, we
use the L1-norm to measure cost, c(x,xA) = ||x− xA||1, as is commonly used in the text domain.
This optimization problem is highly intractable as we do not have a closed form expression for
function Q(x). Further, f(x) is unknown since we only have black-box access to the machine
learning model. Because of high intractability of the problem in Eq. (1), it is important for us to apply
some transformations to make the whole problem tractable. In particular, we convert the constrained
optimization form into one amenable to Bayesian optimization (Section 3).
The main contributions of our work are introducing a new formulation for black-box adversarial
machine learning where minimizing query numbers and proposing a query-minimizing black-box
attack strategy based on Bayesian optimization. Section 4 reports on preliminary experiments using
these techniques to generate spam messages that evade a black-box detector.
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Related Work Prior works have studied black-box attacks on machine learning classifiers in two
categories: substitute model attacks and numerical approximation method-based attacks. The first
type of attack uses query responses obtained from the target model to train a substitute model, and
then generates adversarial examples for that substitute model. Adversarial examples produced this
way are transferable and often effective against the original model [6, 7, 8]. The drawback of the
substitute model is it will suffer form the transfer loss as not all adversarial examples can transfer
from one model to another model [9]. Also, the number of training instances needed to produce
an effective substitute model may be very large. One recent work in [10] adopts slightly different
strategy by learning a separate attacker model, which is trained to produce adversarial samples to the
target model. However, the query number minimization is still not explicitly considered in [10].
Another line of work, introduced by Chen et al. [9], is to apply some numerical approximation to
model gradient calculation to support known white-box attack strategies. This approximates gradient
information by the symmetric difference quotient and further utilizes the Carlini and Wagner attack
[11] to generate adversarial examples. This approach requires a large number of queries since the
gradient needs to be calculated in each step and each gradient estimation requires many model
evaluations because of the high-dimensional feature space.
Previous papers on black-box attacks do not explicitly consider minimizing the total number of model
interactions. A closely related work by Li and Vorobeychik [5] considers the spam email setting and
sets a bound on the total number of queries and feature modification cost. The attacker then applies a
query strategy to find adversarial examples. However, this work only considers linear classifiers. In
contrast, our work applies to arbitrary (continuous) classifiers, including neural networks and other
linear models.
2 Background on Bayesian Optimization
Bayesian optimization (BO) is a derivative free strategy for global optimization of black-box functions
[12, 13, 14]. The Bayesian optimization problem can be formulated as:
min g(x) s.t. h(x) ≤ 0.
where g(x) is an unknown function and h(x) can either be known or unknown. Unlike traditional
optimization algorithms, BO does not depend on gradient or Hessian information; instead, it works
by querying the function value of a point in each step of the interactive optimization process [12]. As
queries to g(x) are assumed to be costly, the algorithm minimizes the total number of queries used in
the whole search process.
Since the objective function is unknown, a prior over the function is assumed to be known, e.g.,
Gaussian prior [15] is commonly used [12, 14, 13]. With the defined priors and current observations,
the posterior probability of next function value can be defined. With the posterior probability
distribution, an acquisition function, Acq(x) is then defined to capture an exploration-exploitation
trade-off in determining the next query point [16, 17]. Points with larger Acq(x) values are likely to
have smaller g(x) values. Thus, we prefer to query points where Acq(x) is large. Since the goal for
each step is to select a point that maximizes the current acquisition function, the whole optimization
process heuristically minimizes number of interactions needed to find a solution. Convergence rate of
Bayesian optimization can be referred to [16, 17].
Exploration prefers points where the uncertainty is high, while exploitation prefers points where
the objective function value is low (for minimization problems). After each function evaluation, the
acquisition function is updated along with the posterior probabilities. For this work, we use the upper
confidence bound (UCB) selection criterion in selecting the specific acquisition function type. As
we assume the unknown function value g(x) at point x follows Gaussian distribution, we obtain the
closed form expression of the acquisition function (UCB) for point x as Acq(x) = µ(x) + κσ(x),
where σ(x) and µ(x) are variance and mean functions, respectively, at point x and κ is a constant.
Brouchu et al.’s tutorial [12] provides more details regarding different types of acquisition functions
and closed form expressions for µ(x), σ(x). Once the query result g(xt) of the point xt is returned,
the BO framework updates its belief about the unknown function distribution and the whole procedure
iterates until termination condition is satisfied.
2
3 Minimizing Queries with Bayesian Optimization
As discussed in Section 1, we face two major challenges: no closed form expression for function
Q(x) and an unknown constraint in f(x), where only queries to f(x) are allowed. We handle the
unknown constraint by following the approach used by Carlini and Wagner [11, 1] by moving the
intractable classification label constraint into the objective function. Since we do not know f(x),
we transform the constraint of f(x) 6= f(xA) as minimizing the probability of x having same label
with xA. In order to minimize the total number of queries, as outlined in the objective function of
Eq. (1), we adopt a heuristic strategy for minimization. Namely, in each query step, we use our
query history to select the apparently best point for solving the optimization problem. Hence, specific
to our problem, in each query step, we find the best point for minimizing Pr[f(x) == f(xA)] and
consequently, the whole optimization process eventually minimizes function Q(x) (i.e. the total
number of queries). Our query step will terminate once we have found a valid instance whose label is
different from xA. The problem can be mathematically formulated as:
min Pr[f(x) == f(xA)] s.t. c(x,xA) ≤ C (2)
To solve the problem in Eq. (2), we adopt the Bayesian optimization framework which is well-
suited for solving an unknown function (in our case, Pr[f(x) == f(xA)]) minimization with a
minimal number of queries (i.e., minimizing Q(x)). Note that c(x,xA) is a function known to the
adversary (i.e., L1-norm constraint). We now have a Bayesian optimization problem with an unknown
objective and known constraint. We use Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) as the acquisition function
(Acq(x)) and in each step we select the point that maximizes Acq(x) with respect to the constraint
c(x,xA) ≤ C.
We apply the DIRECT algorithm [18] to solve acquisition function maximization problem in Eq. (2).
DIRECT is a well-known algorithm for solving global optimization problems. To increase the robust-
ness of the code when facing a small cost budget C, we applied DIRECT with minor modifications.
DIRECT works by dividing a unit hypercube sequentially and evaluating function values in each of
the sub-hyper-rectangles [18] and the initial point is center of the unit hypercube. Originally, each
dimension value of this point was determined by the lower and upper bounds in that dimension.
When C is very small and the initial center is too far away from initial point xA, it is very hard to
find an instance within the feature cost budget (which will result in very long search time). Instead,
we now take the initial point xA as the center of the unit hypercube such that we can always find
instances that satisfy the feature modification cost constraint. Algorithm 1 summaries our Bayesian
optimization algorithm; details regarding Guassian process update can be found in Rasmussen [15].
Algorithm 1 Bayesian Optimization Based Black-box Attack
Input: xA, C, f(xA), N (maximum number of iterations)
Output: x∗
1: x∗ = xA
2: for t = 1, 2, ..., N do
3: Find xt by solving problem xt = argmax Acq(x|D1:t−1), s.t. c(x,xA) ≤ C
4: Sample the objective function value: yt = Pr(f(xt) == f(xA))
5: if f(xt) 6= f(xA) then
6: return x∗ = xt;
7: end if
8: Augment the data D1:t = {D1:t−1, (xt, yt)} and update the Gaussian Process and Acq(x).
9: end for
4 Evaluation
We have conducted preliminary experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of BO based black-box
attacks using a spam email dataset. The attacker’s objective is to create a spam email, x∗, that is
misclassified by the unknown classifier but is within C of the original spam email xA.
Spam Email Dataset The dataset [19] contains 4601 records and each record holds 57 attributes.
Among the 57 features, 2 of them are integers (we discard these two attributes as we currently only
handle continuous features). Every email is labeled as either spam or normal. We randomly choose
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Figure 1: Average Query Number w.r.t Different Cost Budgets for Different Classifiers
3500 of the instances to train three different classifiers, and report the error rate on the remaining
dataset. The original instance xA is randomly selected from the spam emails testing set.
Classifier Models We train both linear and RBF kernel probabilistic SVM, which achieve classifi-
cation accuracy of 91% and 94% respectively. Details of transforming normal SVM into probabilistic
SVM can be found in Platt [20]. We also train an ANN model with classification accuracy of 94%.
Results and Discussion We compare our results with random search, which randomly generates
values for each dimension and terminates the search process when the class label is changed. Specif-
ically, we take the cost budget C and generate random samples whose L1-distance to xA is in the
range of (C − , C). We set  = 0.05. Our assumption here is, having larger distance to the original
instance can maximize the chance of flipping into opponent class, assuming the boundary of the
classifier does not have a highly irregular shape.
For different classifiers, we compare the number of queries needed to find the first successful
adversarial example for both algorithms (BO attack and random search) as we vary C from 1 to
60. Note that, when C is extremely small, the chance of finding an adversarial example within the
boundary is rare. Hence, we set some threshold values for both algorithms and once the iteration
number exceeds the threshold, we take it as an indicator of non-existence of adversarial example. For
our experiments, we set 50 as the upper limit for BO attack, and 500 for random search.
Figure 1 shows the average query number with respect to different feature modification cost budget
C for the three models. We see significant reductions in the number of queries using the BO attack
for all of the classifiers. Note that, the average number of queries shown here is a conservative
estimate for the BO method, since we take all iterations of BO exceeding 50 as failure and compute
the iteration number as 500 for fair comparison with random search method. For cases where C
is small, our BO attack is substantially more efficient. For example, for the ANN Classifier with
C = 10, it takes 16 queries to find the first successful adversarial example, compared to over 400 for
the random search.
5 Conclusion
Our proposed black-box attack strategy considers the problem of generating adversarial example with
minimum number of queries. We believe there are many scenarios where attackers will be limited in
the number of interactions they have with a target model, so understanding the number of queries
needed to find adversarial examples with high probability is an important problem. Our proposed
Bayesian optimization approach shows promise in our preliminary experiments, and it is a general
strategy that can be used against any classifier.
Our ongoing work will improve the BO attacks, compare with other black-box attacking methods, and
test on data from different domains (e.g., image and text). We also note that, our approach can work
for both targeted and untargeted attack. For targeted attacks, we simply set the objective function as
maximizing Pr[f(x) == y∗], where y∗ is the target class.
It is currently under investigation if the current approach can scale up to very high dimensions (e.g.,
image dataset) as performance of Bayesian optimization typically deteriorates in high dimensional
case. For future directions, it is interesting to study the problem in a more restricted black-box case,
where attackers only get classification labels. Another interesting direction is to provide a provable
minimum modification to the original instance for adversarial sample generation in black-box setting.
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